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Abstract
In this paper we analyze a situation in which several firms deal with inventory problems
concerning the same type of product. We consider that each firm uses its limited capacity
warehouse for storing purposes and that it faces an economic order quantity model where
storage costs are irrelevant (and assumed to be zero) and shortages are allowed. In this
setting, we show that firms can save costs by placing joint orders and obtain an optimal
order policy for the firms. Besides, we identify an associated class of costs games which we
show to be concave. Finally, we introduce and study a rule to share the costs among the
firms which provides core allocations and can be easily computed.
1 Introduction
The analysis of multi-agent inventory models is a flourishing research field in the frontier be-
tween game theory and operations research. In a multi-agent inventory model several agents
facing individual inventory problems cooperate by coordinating their orders for the purpose of
reducing costs. In the analysis of one of these models two main issues are usually addressed:
first, what is the optimal order policy of the group of cooperating agents; second, how the
ordering costs should be shared among the agents. Meca et al. (2003) focus on a joint replen-
ishment problem where agents follow an Economic Production Quantity policy with shortages.
Meca et al. (2004) study the joint replenishment problem where agents agree to place joint
orders by means of the classical Economic Order Quantity policy. In both papers authors use
cooperative games to model the corresponding situations. Besides, in Meca et al. (2003) and
Korpeoglu et al. (2012) a non-cooperative approach is taken. Nagarajan and Sos˘ic´ (2008), Dror
and Hartman (2011) and Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2012) are recent surveys of multi-agent inven-
tory models; Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2011) review the applications of cooperative game theory
for sharing cost problems.
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In most inventory models a positive storage cost per item and time unit is assumed to
exist. However, in some situations storage costs are fixed (i.e. independent of the size of the
stock) and therefore can be disregarded in the optimization problem. This can be the case, for
instance, when the storage costs are only due to the maintenance of the warehouse. Notice that
when storage costs are irrelevant and fixed ordering costs are positive, in a continuous review
setting, the orders should be as large as possible and, thus, the capacity of the warehouse
becomes significant.
There are many papers dealing with limited capacity inventory models. In fact, most of the
classical and modern books on inventory management include the basic ideas on capacitated
inventory; see, for instance, Tersine (1994) and Zipkin (2000). A survey on capacitated lot sizing
can be found in Karimi et al. (2003). More recently, Ng et al. (2009) study an economic order
quantity model where the warehouse capacity is limited and is, moreover, a decision variable
of the model. Parker and Kapucinski (2011) consider the non-cooperative interaction between
a retailer and a supplier in a two-stage, periodic review, limited capacity inventory model; it
provides a Markov equilibrium policy for the model. On the contrary, as far as we know, apart
from Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2013), the literature has not treated multi-agent inventory models
with limited capacity and fixed storage costs. However, there are a variety of real situations
which may be modeled in this way.
Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2013) deal with an inventory problem arising in a farming commu-
nity in the Northwest of Spain. It considers a collection of stockbreeders (each one owning a
relatively small livestock farm) that need livestock feed and place orders to an external sup-
plier. Each farm has its own silo (warehouse), with limited capacity, for keeping the feed. The
only costs associated with the silos are their building costs since their maintenance costs are ir-
relevant; thus, the storage cost of each stockbreeder is in fact zero. Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2013)
analyze then two models with n decision makers, all them facing continuous review inventory
problems without holding costs, with limited capacity warehouses and without shortages. The
fact that shortages are not allowed simplifies strongly the search for optimal policies. However,
the case with shortages can be also used in this context, as we discuss in Example 4.1.
In this paper we analyze a situation in which several firms deal with inventory problems
concerning the same type of product and cooperate by placing joint orders. We consider that
each firm uses its limited capacity warehouse for storing purposes and that it faces an economic
order quantity model where storage costs are irrelevant (and assumed to be zero) and shortages
are allowed. To illustrate our results we use the example in Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2013) when
shortages are allowed. However, the model we introduce in this paper can be successfully used
in other examples, like the following one. Farmers often have their own farm tractors. The fuel
for these vehicles is commonly stored in tanks at the farms, with no maintenance costs. If a
farm’s tank is depleted, then the farm can borrow some extra fuel from one of its neighbors,
at a small cost. Nevertheless, when this farm makes its new fuel order, it has to order an extra
amount of fuel, enough for restoring the borrowed fuel. The replenishment problem when
several farms cooperate can be analyzed with the tools developed in this paper.
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The organization of this paper is as follows. First we introduce the model we analyze:
economic order quantity systems without holding costs. Then we deal with the one decision
maker case, and later we study the case with n firms. We show that firms can save costs by
placing joint orders and, in this case, we obtain an optimal order policy for the firms. Finally,
we provide some results that can be helpful for allocating the joint costs among the firms.
2 The model
An EOQ (Economic Order Quantity) system without holding costs is a multi-agent situation where
each agent faces a continuous review inventory problem with no holding costs, with shortages
and with a limited capacity warehouse. We assume that the lead time is deterministic and can
be taken as zero. N denotes the finite set of agents. The parameters associated to every i ∈ N
in an EOQ system without holding costs are:
• a > 0, the fixed cost per order,
• bi > 0, the shortage cost per item and per time unit,
• di > 0, the deterministic demand per time unit,
• Ki > 0, the capacity of i’s warehouse.
As we mentioned in the introduction, this model is in fact a generalization of one introduced
in Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2013): the basic EOQ system without holding costs. These basic
systems do not allow for shortages and, then, the analysis of the model we introduce in this
paper is fully different. In the operation of an EOQ system without holding costs, every time
that agent i’s maximum shortage level is reached, agent i places an order of size Ki + βi (since
the storage cost is zero, agent i’s warehouse should be complete after each order). Nevertheless,
every agent i has to make a decision on his maximum shortage level βi because Ki is fixed. The
interval time between two consecutive orders of agent i is called a cycle and its length is Ki+βidi .
In an agent i’s cycle, the length of the period that he incurs into shortages is max{βi ,0}di . Besides,
taking into account that the demand is deterministic, the average shortage level in the shortage
period during a cycle is max{βi ,0}2 . Then, agent i’s average cost per cycle is given by
a + bi
max{βi, 0}
2
max{βi, 0}
di
and agent i’s average cost per time unit is given by
Ci(βi) =
a + bi max
2{βi ,0}
2di
Ki+βi
di
=
adi
Ki + βi
+
bi max2{βi, 0}
2(Ki + βi)
,
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where βi > −Ki in order to guarantee a positive cycle length.1 We rewrite the agent i’s cost
function as
Ci(βi) =

adi
Ki+βi
if − Ki < βi ≤ 0
adi
Ki+βi
+
biβ2i
2(Ki+βi)
if 0 ≤ βi.
For simplicity we take the number of orders per time unit as the decision variable, that is
xi :=
di
Ki + βi
, (1)
which implies that
βi =
di − Kixi
xi
.
Then agent i’s cost function can be written as
Ci(xi) =
axi if xi ≥
di
Ki
axi +
bi(di−Kixi)2
2xidi
if 0 < xi ≤ diKi .
(2)
Observe that the ratio demand/capacity (di/Ki) is present in Expression (2). It will play a
relevant role in other issues regarding this model as we will see later on, especially in Section
5.
In this paper we explore the possibilities of cooperation in an EOQ system without holding
costs. When we look at this model from a cooperative point of view, we consider that a non-
empty coalition S ⊂ N has formed and assume that all its members place joint orders. It means
that the cycle length will be the same for every agent in S, i.e.
1
xi
=
Ki + βi
di
=
Kj + β j
dj
=
1
xj
, (3)
for every i, j ∈ S. Equivalently, xi = xj for every i, j ∈ S, i.e., the number of orders per time unit
will be the same for every agent in S. For simplicity we denote x = xi for every i ∈ S. Now, the
average cost per cycle that coalition S faces is given by
a +∑
i∈S
bi
max{βi, 0}
2
max{βi, 0}
di
and the average cost per time unit is given by
a +∑i∈S
bi max2{βi ,0}
2di
Kj+β j
dj
=
adj
Kj + β j
+
dj
Kj + β j
∑
i∈S
bi max2{βi, 0}
2di
.
1In principle, each βi is non-negative. However, when a group of agents makes joint orders it may be optimal
that the maximum shortage level of some agents is negative; notice that in our context storage costs are irrelevant.
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Using the condition of equal cycle length (3), we have that βi = −Ki + dix for all i ∈ S, being
x the number of orders per time unit. Thus, for every x > 0, the average cost per time unit of
coalition S is given by
CS(x) = ax + x∑
i∈S
bi
2di
max2{−Ki + dix , 0}
= ax +
1
x ∑i∈S
bi
2di
max2{−Kix + di, 0}. (4)
3 Individual optimal order policies
Now we obtain the optimal order policy and the minimum average cost per time unit of each
agent i when ordering alone. Note that Ci is a continuous function for every xi > 0. Besides, it
is strictly increasing for every xi ≥ diKi . Then,
min
{
Ci(xi) : xi ≥ diKi
}
=
adi
Ki
. (5)
If 0 < xi <
di
Ki
, then Ci(xi) can be written as(
2a + bi
K2i
di
)
xi
2
+
bidi
2
1
xi
− biKi. (6)
It is a differentiable function and attains a local extreme at xi if its derivative in xi equals zero,
i.e. if
2a + bi
K2i
di
2
− bidi
2x2i
= 0. (7)
The unique value in (0, diKi ) satisfying (7) is
x∗i =
√√√√ bidi
2a + bi
K2i
di
; (8)
notice that x∗i <
di
Ki
because
bidi
2a + bi
K2i
di
=
bid2i
2adi + biK2i
=
bi
2adi
K2i
+ bi
d2i
K2i
<
d2i
K2i
. (9)
For every 0 < xi <
di
Ki
, the second derivative of Ci is
bidi
x3i
> 0.
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Then, Ci is strictly convex in (0, diKi ) and, moreover, x
∗
i is the unique minimum of C
i in (0, diKi ).
Now, the continuity of Ci in (0,∞), (9), and the fact that Ci is strictly increasing in [ diKi ,∞) imply
that x∗i is in fact the unique minimum of C
i in (0,∞). Using (6) and (8) it can be easily checked
that the minimum average cost per time unit of each agent i when ordering alone Ci(x∗i ) is
given by
Ci(x∗i ) =
√
bidi(2a + bi
K2i
di
)− biKi. (10)
Besides, the optimal quantity order for agent i is given by
Q∗i =
di
x∗i
=
√
2a
di
bi
+ K2i . (11)
4 Coalitional optimal order policies
In this section we obtain the optimal order policy and the minimum average cost per time unit
of a non-empty coalition S ⊂ N when all its members cooperate by placing joint orders. For
every such S ⊂ N and every x ∈ (0,+∞) denote by Sx the set {i ∈ S : x < diKi }. In view of the
expression of CS given in (4), we can write
CS(x) = ax +
1
x ∑i∈Sx
bi
2di
(−Kix + di)2. (12)
Notice that CS is a piecewise function whose definition changes on the finite set of points AS =
{ diKi : i ∈ S}. It is easy to check that this function is continuous. Moreover, it is clear that CS
is differentiable in every x ∈ (0,+∞) \ AS.2 It is moreover easy to check that the right and left
derivatives of CS coincide for every x ∈ AS, so it is in fact differentiable in every x ∈ (0,+∞).
Its first derivative is given by
d
dx
CS(x) = a + ∑
i∈Sx
bi
2
K2i
di
− 1
x2 ∑i∈Sx
bidi
2
.
Again, it is clear that ddx C
S is differentiable in every x ∈ (0,+∞) \ AS. Looking at the sign
of its derivative we obtain that ddx C
S is increasing in every x ∈ (0,+∞) \ AS and that it is
strictly increasing in every x ∈ (0, maxi∈S diKi ) \ AS. Then, taking into account that ddx CS is
continuous, it is clear that it is increasing in every x ∈ (0,+∞) and strictly increasing in every
x ∈ (0, maxi∈S diKi ). Thus CS is a convex function in (0,+∞) and strictly convex in (0, maxi∈S
di
Ki
).
Therefore, since
lim
x→0
CS(x) = lim
x→+∞C
S(x) = +∞
and CS is strictly increasing in (maxi∈S diKi ,+∞), there exists a unique extreme of C
S in (0,+∞),
which is a minimum. Now, CS is continuous and differentiable in (0,+∞) and it has a unique
2In fact, it is clear that CS is infinitely differentiable in (0,+∞) \ AS.
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minimum in (0,+∞) implies that this minimum is attained at the unique point x∗S in which its
first derivative is zero. Thus, x∗S is the unique solution of the following equation:
x∗S =
√√√√√ ∑i∈Sx∗S bidi
2a +∑i∈Sx∗S
bi
K2i
di
. (13)
Notice that both numerator and denonimator inside the square root depend on x∗S via Sx∗S . Thus,
(13) is, in fact, an equation that must be solved in an iterative way. Procedure 4.1 provides a
tool to solve this equation.
In order to avoid a cumbersome notation from now on we denote I(S) := Sx∗S . In view of
(12) and (13), we have that
CS(x∗S) =
(
2a + ∑
i∈I(S)
bi
K2i
di
)
x∗S
2
+ ∑
i∈I(S)
bidi
2
1
x∗S
− ∑
i∈I(S)
biKi
= ∑
i∈I(S)
bidi
√√√√2a +∑i∈I(S) bi K2idi
∑i∈I(S) bidi
− ∑
i∈I(S)
biKi (14)
= ∑
i∈I(S)
bi
(
di
x∗S
− Ki
)
.
In addition, the optimal quantity order for each i ∈ S is given by
Q∗i =
di
x∗S
=
√√√√ d2i
∑j∈I(S) bjdj
(2a + ∑
j∈I(S)
bj
K2j
dj
). (15)
Notice that, as it should be, (14) reduces to (10) and (15) reduces to (11) when S = {i} (for
any i ∈ N).
Next we describe an iterative procedure to solve Equation (13) easily and to compute x∗S
and I(S) for any non-empty S ⊂ N. Notice that such x∗S exists and it is unique. Denote s = |S|.
Procedure 4.1. Take S ⊂ N
1. Let S = {i1, i2, . . . , is} be the agents in S arranged in non-decreasing order of the ratios de-
mand/capacity. Thus,
di1
Ki1
≤ di2Ki2 ≤ · · · ≤
dis
Kis
.
2. Initialize k = s + 1, T = ∅, xT = 0, and SxT = S.
3. Do while SxT 6= T:
Set k = k− 1, T = T ∪ {ik}, and compute
xT =
√√√√√ ∑il∈T bil dil
2a +∑il∈T bil
K2il
dil
and SxT = {il ∈ S : xT <
dil
Kil
}.
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4. Let I(S) = T and x∗S = xT. STOP.
Notice that the above procedure finishes after a finite number of steps (smaller than or equal
to s). In each step, it incorporates an agent with the largest ratio demand/capacity among
agents in S \ T to coalition T. Once xT is calculated and SxT is obtained, it compares sets T and
SxT . If both sets coincide, it obtains the unique solution of Equation (13) and the procedure
finishes; otherwise, it updates k and T and makes the calculations again.
The following result shows a kind of monotonicity of the optimal number of orders of a
non-empty coalition. It is an attractive property; moreover we use it later on in this paper.
Theorem 4.1. Let (N, a, b, d, K) be an EOQ system without holding costs and take a pair of non-empty
coalitions P, S ⊂ N with P ⊂ S. Then x∗P ≤ x∗S.
Proof. See Appendix.
To finish this section we present an example that we have encountered while collaborating
with an agricultural cooperative in the Northwest of Spain. We use this example to illustrate the
concepts introduced up to now, as well as Procedure 4.1. This example has been also considered
in Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2013), but now we consider that shortages are allowed.
Example 4.1. This example is based on feedback obtained from dairy farmers in northwestern Spain;
the data considered here are fictitious but realistic. A standard dairy farm in northwestern Spain has
between 40 and 150 dairy cows. The cow feeding is varied and the feeding ration must have the necessary
nutrients to maintaining a high daily production of milk (between 25 and 35 liters). The feeding ration
can be decomposed into two parts. On one hand, a part that has to be stored at the farm in warehouses,
called silos. On the other hand, a part that must be daily obtained and that cannot be stored. We are
interested in the management of the former part, the one that is stored. From now on, we refer to this
part of the feeding ration as the dry feed and we refer to the other part as the non-dry feed. The cost of
one ton of dry feed is similar to the cost of producing one ton of non-dry feed. The silos, where the dry
feed is stored, have a constant maintenance cost. Indeed, this cost is negligible and can be considered to
be zero. The dry feed is ordered to an external supplier. There is a fixed cost of a euros each time that
an order is made; this fixed cost is mainly due to transportation. Each cow consumes about 10 kg of dry
feed for producing about 30 liters of milk per day. When there is a shortage of dry feed, the feeding ration
has to be changed in the sense that it can only contain non-dry feed. The daily production of milk can
be maintained but its quality decreases. So, although the cost of the new feeding ration does not change
significantly, there is a cost due to the economic impact of the decrease of the quality; this cost is b euros
per ton and day. Notice that if a shortage of dry feed occurs, the feeding ration changes and the deficit
amount is not replenished. However, this problem fits into the full backordering model studied in this
paper because the costs of both non-dry feed and dry feed are the same.
For simplicity we consider an example with four dairy farms N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. The dairy cattle is
formed by 45, 95, 105 and 120 cows, respectively. The fixed cost per order is a = 180 (in euros) and the
demand (in tons per day), the shortage costs (in euros per ton and day) and the capacity of silos (in tons)
for each dairy farm are given in the next table, whose last column depicts the ratios demand/capacity.
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i di bi Ki
di
Ki
1 0.45 15 5 0.090
2 0.95 15 7.5 0.127
3 1.05 10 8 0.131
4 1.20 12 9 0.133
Assume that the dairy farms 1, 2 and 4 decide to cooperate by ordering together, so S = {1, 2, 4}.
Let us compute CS(x∗S). First we calculate I(S) and x
∗
S. We proceed iteratively using the non-increasing
arrangement of the dairy farms’ ratios demand/capacity. Take T = {4} and compute
xT =
√√√√ ∑i∈T bidi
2a +∑i∈T bi
K2i
di
=
√√√√ b4d4
2a + b4
K24
d4
=
√
14.4
360+ 810
=
√
14.4
1170
.
Let us note that SxT = {i ∈ S : xT < diKi } = {2, 4} and SxT 6= T. Then, xT does not satisfy (13) and,
hence, x∗S 6= xT and I(S) 6= T. Take now T = {2, 4} and compute
xT =
√√√√ ∑i∈T bidi
2a +∑i∈T bi
K2i
di
=
√√√√ b2d2 + b4d4
2a + b2
K22
d2
+ b4
K24
d4
=
√
14.25+ 14.4
360+ 888.158+ 810
=
√
28.65
2058.158
.
Now, since SxT = {2, 4} = T, xT satisfies (13), we have I(S) = T = {2, 4} and x∗S = xT. Finally,
using (14), we have that
CS(x∗S) =
b2d2 + b4d4
x∗S
− b2K2 − b4K4 = 22.330.
Following similar calculations, one can obtain CS(x∗S) for every non-empty S ⊂ N.
S {1} {2} {3} {4} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {2, 3}
CS(x∗S) 14.750 20.865 20.896 21.800 20.865 20.896 21.800 21.924
S {2, 4} {3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4} {2, 3, 4} N
CS(x∗S) 22.330 22.500 21.924 22.330 22.500 22.671 22.671
5 Profitability of the grand coalition and cost allocation procedures
In the last section we obtained an expression for the minimum cost associated with each non-
empty coalition S ⊂ N when its members place joint orders for a given EOQ system without
holding costs (N, a, b, d, K). In terms of cooperative game theory, we have obtained the cost
game c associated to the system (N, a, b, d, K), c being a map which assigns to every non-empty
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S ⊂ N the real number CS(x∗S). So, from now on, we write3
c(S) = ∑
i∈I(S)
bidi
√√√√2a +∑i∈I(S) bi K2idi
∑i∈I(S) bidi
− ∑
i∈I(S)
biKi,
for every non-empty S ⊂ N. For the results we prove in this section, assume that a system
(N, a, b, d, K) is given and that c is its associated cost game.
We consider now the following issue. Is it profitable for the agents in N to form the grand
coalition to place joint orders? In this section we prove that the answer to this question is
positive because c is a subadditive game, in the sense that
c(S ∪ T) ≤ c(S) + c(T),
for all S, T ∈ N with S ∩ T = ∅. Notice that the superadditivity condition implies that if N
is partitioned into disjoint ordering coalitions (whose integrants place joint orders) the corre-
sponding cost will not decrease.
In fact we prove that c is not only subadditive but also concave, in the sense that
c(T ∪ j)− c(T) ≤ c(S ∪ j)− c(S) (16)
for all j ∈ N and all S, T ⊂ N with S ( T ⊂ N \ j. It is a well known result in cooperative game
theory that every concave game is subadditive. Moreover, the concavity property provides us
with additional information about the game: the marginal contribution of an agent diminishes
as a coalition grows (according to (16)).
Theorem 5.1. Let (N, a, b, d, K) be an EOQ system without holding costs with associated cost game c.
Then c is a concave game.
Proof. See Appendix.
So we proved that in an EOQ system without holding costs (N, a, b, d, K) it is efficient that
all players place joint orders. In that case, the optimal average cost per time unit is given by
c(N) = ∑
i∈I(N)
bidi
√√√√2a +∑i∈I(N) bi K2idi
∑i∈I(N) bidi
− ∑
i∈I(N)
biKi.
An allocation rule for EOQ systems without holding costs is a map φ which assigns a vector
φ(c) ∈ RN to every EOQ system without holding costs (N, a, b, d, K) with associated cost game
c, satisfying that ∑i∈N φi(c) = c(N). Each component φi(c) indicates the cost allocated to i,
so an allocation rule for EOQ systems without holding costs is a procedure to allocate the
optimal cost among the agents in N when they cooperate. An allocation rule should have good
properties from the following points of view.
3By convention, c(∅) = 0.
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1. The proposal of the rule for a particular system should be computable in a reasonable
CPU time, even when the number of agents is large.
2. It is very convenient that the rule proposes for every system an allocation which belongs
to the core of the associated cost game (see, for instance, González-Díaz et al. (2010)
for details on the core of a cooperative game). This means that, for every EOQ system
without holding costs (N, a, b, d, K) with associated cost game c, φ should satisfy the fol-
lowing:
∑
i∈S
φi(c) ≤ c(S), for every S ⊂ N.
Notice that this condition assures that no group S is disappointed with the proposal of
the rule, because the cost allocated to it is less than or equal to the cost it would support if
its members formed a coalition to place joint orders independently of the agents in N \ S.
3. The proposal of the rule must be understandable and acceptable by the agents.
Since the cost games associated to EOQ systems without holding costs are concave, cooper-
ative game theory provides allocation rules for EOQ systems without holding costs with good
properties at least with respect to items 2 and 3. We highlight the Shapley value and the nucle-
olus, which always provide core allocations in this context (see González-Díaz et al. (2010) for
details on them). However, both allocations are hard to compute when the number of agents
increases.
Next we define an allocation rule for EOQ systems without holding costs and discuss its
qualification with respect to the three items enumerated above. In fact, the interest of this rule
is that it selects in a very natural way a point in the core. It has excellent properties with respect
to items 1 and 2. Its interest from the point of view of item 3 will be discussed later on.
Definition 5.1. The rule R we propose assigns to every EOQ system without holding costs (N, a, b, d, K)
with associated cost game c the allocation vector R(c) ∈ RN given by:
Ri(c) =
bi
di
x∗N
− biKi if i ∈ I(N)
0 otherwise.
This rule can be computed easily. Moreover, its complexity increases polynomially on the
number of agents. So, it is clear that R is a good rule from the point of view of computability.
With respect to the second item, the following theorem shows that R proposes for every
system an allocation which belongs to the core of the associated cost game.4
Theorem 5.2. Let (N, a, b, d, K) be an EOQ system without holding costs with associated cost game c.
Then, for every S ⊂ N,
∑
i∈S
Ri(c) ≤ c(S).
4Notice that R provides in fact a PMAS of c in the sense of Sprumont (1990); it easily follows from Theorem 5.2
and the definitions of R and c.
11
Proof. See Appendix.
Now we make some comments on our rule R which have to do with the third item. R
can be explained in the following way. Only agents having a large ratio demand/capacity
(henceforth “large agents”) will have to contribute to the payment of the cost. With large ratio
we mean that it is larger than the optimal number of orders per time unit. If the set of large
agents is a singleton, i.e., I(N) = {n}, agent n pays all the cost; in this case he incurs a cost
equal to his stand-alone cost. If there are multiple large agents, each agent pays less than his
stand-alone cost. Notice that the agents who are not large agents do not pay anything and,
hence, can be seen as a kind of free riders. Free-riding agents appear in many contexts, for
instance in Bergstrom (1986) for general public good problems and in Korpeoglu et al. (2012)
for the private contributions game for joint replenishment. Korpeoglu et al. (2012) can always
find a Nash equilibrium with free-riding in which only one of the firms finances the entire
replenishment cost and the others ride free. In our setting, it seems that large agents should
probably enlarge the capacity of their warehouses (in view of their demands). That is the reason
why our rule R is understable and aceptable even though they are forced to support all the cost.
We finish this section computing the proposal of R in Example 4.1 and comparing it with
the proposal of other rules.
Example 5.1. Consider again the EOQ system without holding costs of Example 4.1 and its corre-
sponding cost game. It can be easily proven that I(N) = {2, 3, 4}. Then R1(c) = 0. To obtain Ri(c)
for i ∈ {2, 3, 4}, we compute the expected cycle length for N
1
x∗N
=
√√√√2a +∑i∈I(N) bi K2idi
∑i∈I(N) bidi
=
√√√√2a + b2 K22d2 + b3 K23d3 + b4 K24d4
b2d2 + b3d3 + b4d4
=
√
2667.682
39.150
.
Then
R2(c) =
b2d2
x∗N
− b2K2 = 5.129,
R3(c) =
b3d3
x∗N
− b3K3 = 6.674,
R4(c) =
b4d4
x∗N
− b4K4 = 10.868.
Finally, we compute the proposal for this example of other two well-known solution concepts, the
Shapley value and the nucleolus. The proposal of the three rules are displayed in the next table.
Observe that in this example the three rules suggest that the bigger the ratio demand/capacity of an
agent is, the more that this agent will have to pay (this is not true in general). With this principle in
mind the nucleolus tends to equalize the costs supported by the agents whereas our rule tends to take
more account of the differences; the Shapley value plays a more moderate middle. As a consequence of
this and the fact that we have a small number of agents, in this example the Shapley value might be the
most appropiate rule among all the three rules depicted in Table 5.1.
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i Ri(c) Shi(c) Nui(c)
1 0 3.687 5.353
2 5.129 6.043 5.524
3 6.674 6.143 5.694
4 10.868 6.798 6.100
Table 1: Three rules.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze multiple agent situations where each agent faces a continuous review
inventory problem without holding costs, with shortages and with a limited capacity ware-
house. We find a collective optimal policy when a group of agents agrees to cooperate and
place joint orders. In this context we show that the formation of the largest possible coalition
(the grand coalition) is profitable. Moreover we indicate how cooperative game theory can be
used to allocate the cost among the agents and we identify a natural allocation for each prob-
lem which satisfies attractive properties from the points of view of computability and stability.
We illustrate our results with an example that we have encountered while collaborating with
an agricultural cooperative in the Northwest of Spain.
Acknowledgements
Authors acknowledge the financial support of Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación through projects
MTM2011-23205, MTM2011-27731-C03, of Xunta de Galicia through project INCITE09-207-064-
PR, and of Generalitat Valenciana through project ACOMP/2014.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof. We distinguish three cases.
1. P∩ I(S) = ∅. Then I(P)∩ I(S) = ∅. Consequently, for all i ∈ I(P), x∗S ≥ diKi . Besides x∗P <
di
Ki
for all i ∈ I(P). Then, x∗P < x∗S.
2. P ∩ I(S) = I(S). In view of Procedure 4.1 it is clear that in this case x∗P = x∗S.
3. ∅ 6= P ∩ I(S) ( I(S). Notice that (13) implies that√√√√2a +∑l∈I(S) bl K2ldl
∑l∈I(S) bldl
>
Kj
dj
, for every j ∈ I(S)
or
2a +∑l∈I(S) bl
K2l
dl
∑l∈I(S) bldl
>
K2j
d2j
, for every j ∈ I(S). (17)
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Multiplying by bjdj each side of Inequality (17), for every j ∈ I(S) \ P, adding all of them up,
and dividing the final inequality by ∑j∈I(S)\P bjdj, we obtain
∑j∈I(S)\P bjdj
∑j∈I(S)\P bjdj
2a +∑l∈I(S) bl
K2l
dl
∑l∈I(S) bldl
=
2a +∑l∈I(S) bl
K2l
dl
∑l∈I(S) bldl
>
∑j∈I(S)\P bj
K2j
dj
∑j∈I(S)\P bjdj
(18)
(note that ∑j∈I(S)\P bjdj 6= 0 because P ∩ I(S) ( I(S)). Expression (18) is equivalent to
∑
j∈I(S)\P
bjdj(2a + ∑
l∈I(S)
bl
K2l
dl
) > ∑
l∈I(S)
bldl ∑
j∈I(S)\P
bj
K2j
dj
. (19)
Both substracting ∑l∈I(S)\P bldl ∑l∈I(S)\P bl
K2l
dl
and adding 2a∑l∈I(S)∩P bldl to each side in (19),
we get
2a ∑
l∈I(S)
bldl + ∑
l∈I(S)\P
bldl ∑
l∈I(S)∩P
bl
K2l
dl
> 2a ∑
l∈I(S)∩P
bldl + ∑
l∈I(S)∩P
bldl ∑
l∈I(S)\P
bl
K2l
dl
. (20)
Adding ∑l∈I(S)∩P bldl ∑l∈I(S)∩P bl
K2l
dl
to each side in (20), we obtain
2a ∑
l∈I(S)
bldl + ∑
l∈I(S)
bldl ∑
l∈I(S)∩P
bl
K2l
dl
> 2a ∑
l∈I(S)∩P
bldl + ∑
l∈I(S)∩P
bldl ∑
l∈I(S)
bl
K2l
dl
. (21)
Finally, dividing both sides in (21) by ∑l∈I(S) bldl ∑l∈I(S)∩P bldl , we obtain
2a +∑l∈I(S)∩P bl
K2l
dl
∑l∈I(S)∩P bldl
>
2a +∑l∈I(S) bl
K2l
dl
∑l∈I(S) bldl
(22)
(note that ∑l∈I(S) bldl ∑l∈I(S)∩P bldl 6= 0 because ∅ 6= P ∩ I(S)). Rewriting (22) and combining
it with (17), we have
∑l∈I(S)∩P bldl
2a +∑l∈I(S)∩P bl
K2l
dl
<
∑l∈I(S) bldl
2a +∑l∈I(S) bl
K2l
dl
<
d2j
K2j
, for every j ∈ I(S).
In particular,
∑l∈I(S)∩P bldl
2a +∑l∈I(S)∩P bl
K2l
dl
<
∑l∈I(S) bldl
2a +∑l∈I(S) bl
K2l
dl
<
d2j
K2j
, for every j ∈ P ∩ I(S). (23)
The Procedure 4.1, the definition of I(P), and this last inequality imply that P ∩ I(S) ⊂ I(P);
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then P ∩ I(S) ⊂ I(P) ∩ I(S) and thus P ∩ I(S) = I(P) ∩ I(S). Now we check that
2a +∑l∈I(P) bl
K2l
dl
∑l∈I(P) bldl
>
2a +∑l∈I(S) bl
K2l
dl
∑l∈I(S) bldl
. (24)
If I(P) = P ∩ I(S), (24) is in fact (22). If P ∩ I(S) 6= I(P) then I(P) \ I(S) 6= ∅ and, by the
definition of I(S), we have
K2j
d2j
≥ 2a +∑l∈I(S) bl
K2l
dl
∑l∈I(S) bldl
, for every j ∈ I(P) \ I(S) (25)
and then, multiplying by bjdj in both sides of (25), adding up for j ∈ I(P) \ I(S), and dividing
by ∑j∈I(P)\I(S) bjdj, we obtain
∑l∈I(P)\I(S) bl
K2l
dl
∑j∈I(P)\I(S) bjdj
≥ 2a +∑l∈I(S) bl
K2l
dl
∑l∈I(S) bldl
(26)
(note that ∑j∈I(P)\I(S) bjdj 6= 0 because I(P) \ I(S) 6= ∅). Besides, using (26) and taking into
account that I(P) = (I(P) ∩ I(S)) ∪ (I(P) \ I(S)), we have
2a + ∑
l∈I(P)
bl
K2l
dl
≥ 2a + ∑
l∈I(P)∩I(S)
bl
K2l
dl
+ ∑
j∈I(P)\I(S)
bjdj
2a +∑l∈I(S) bl
K2l
dl
∑l∈I(S) bldl
.
Using (22) and I(P) ∩ I(S) = P ∩ I(S), we obtain
2a + ∑
l∈I(P)
bl
K2l
dl
> ∑
j∈I(P)∩I(S)
bjdj
2a +∑l∈I(S) bl
K2l
dl
∑l∈I(S) bldl
+ ∑
j∈I(P)\I(S)
bjdj
2a +∑l∈I(S) bl
K2l
dl
∑l∈I(S) bldl
and then (24) holds.
The following result is used in the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Lemma A.1. Let (N, a, b, d, K) be an EOQ system without holding costs and take a pair of non-empty
coalitions S, T ⊂ N with S ( T. Then CT(x)−CS(x) = CT\S(x)− ax for all x ∈ (0,+∞). Moreover,
CP(x)− ax is a non-increasing function in (0,+∞) for all non-empty P ⊂ N.
Proof. Clearly
CT(x)− CS(x) = 1x ∑j∈Tx
bj
2dj
(−Kjx + dj)2 − 1x ∑j∈Sx
bj
2dj
(−Kjx + dj)2
= 1x ∑j∈(T\S)x
bj
2dj
(−Kjx + dj)2 = CT\S(x)− ax.
In Section 4 we proved that CP(x) is differentiable in (0,+∞) for all non-empty P ⊂ N. Thus
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CP(x)− ax is differentiable in (0,+∞). Its first derivative is given by
− 1
x2 ∑j∈Px
bj
2dj
(−Kjx + dj)2 − 1x ∑j∈Px
Kjbj
dj
(−Kjx + dj). (27)
Notice that (27) is smaller than or equal to zero because x ≤ djKj for every j ∈ Px, which com-
pletes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.1.
Proof. Take j ∈ N and S ( T ⊂ N \ j. We will prove that c(T ∪ j)− c(T) ≤ c(S ∪ j)− c(S). We
distinguish two cases.
• If x∗T ≥ x∗S∪j, then
c(T ∪ j)− c(T) = CT∪j(x∗T∪j)− CT(x∗T) ≤ CT∪j(x∗T)− CT(x∗T)
= Cj(x∗T)− ax∗T
where the first inequality follows from the fact that x∗T∪j gives the minimum value of C
T∪j
and the second line follows from Lemma A.1. If S 6= ∅, by Lemma A.1 and the fact that
x∗S gives the minimum value of C
S,
Cj(x∗T)− ax∗T ≤ Cj(x∗S∪j)− ax∗S∪j = CS∪j(x∗S∪j)−CS(x∗S∪j) ≤ c(S∪ j)−CS(x∗S) = c(S∪ j)− c(S).
If S = ∅ then, by Lemma A.1
Cj(x∗T)− ax∗T ≤ Cj(x∗S∪j)− ax∗S∪j = Cj(x∗j )− ax∗j ≤ Cj(x∗j ) = c(j)− c(∅).
• If x∗T < x∗S∪j then following a similar reasoning as above we have
c(T ∪ j)− c(S ∪ j) = CT∪j(x∗T∪j)− CS∪j(x∗S∪j) ≤ CT∪j(x∗S∪j)− CS∪j(x∗S∪j)
= CT\S(x∗S∪j)− ax∗S∪j.
If S 6= ∅, by Lemma A.1 and the fact that x∗S gives the minimum value of CS,
CT\S(x∗S∪j)− ax∗S∪j = CT(x∗S∪j)−CS(x∗S∪j) ≤ CT(x∗T)−CS(x∗T) ≤ c(T)−CS(x∗S) = c(T)− c(S).
If S = ∅ then x∗T < x
∗
S∪j becomes x
∗
T < x
∗
j and, by Lemma A.1
CT\S(x∗S∪j)− ax∗S∪j = CT(x∗j )− ax∗j ≤ CT(x∗T)− ax∗T ≤ c(T) = c(T)− c(∅).
Proof of Theorem 5.2.
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Proof. By the definition of the allocation rule R, it is clear that ∑i∈N Ri(c) = c(N). Take S ⊂ N.
If S ∩ I(N) = ∅, then
∑
i∈S
Ri(c) ≤ c(S).
Now we consider the case S∩ I(N) 6= ∅. Applying Theorem 4.1 to coalitions S and N we have
x∗S ≤ x∗N . Moreover, it is clear that I(S) ∩ I(N) ⊂ S ∩ I(N). The Procedure 4.1, the definition
of I(S) and I(N), and (23) applied to S and N imply that S ∩ I(N) ⊂ I(S) ∩ I(N). Now, using
(13), x∗S ≤ x∗N , and the definition of I(S), we have
∑i∈S Ri(c)− c(S) = ∑i∈S∩I(N) Ri(c) +∑i∈I(S) biKi −∑i∈I(S) bidi 1x∗S
= ∑i∈I(S)\I(N)[bidi
Ki
di
− bidi 1x∗S ]
+ ∑i∈I(S)∩I(N) bidi[ 1x∗N −
1
x∗S
] ≤ 0.
Then, ∑i∈S Ri(c) ≤ c(S).
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